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Abstract 
 
This paper deals with contractual design and vertical relationships within a franchise chain, in 
the field of the literature on share contracts. Within a double-sided moral hazard, the contract 
sharing the profit generated by the vertical decentralized structure results from the necessity to 
incite both the franchisee and the franchisor. This paper takes into account the five franchisor 
incentive mechanisms in order to study the chosen type of vertical coordination in different 
contexts. Using a multinational European dataset, we provide evidence that the two-sided 
externalities and monitoring costs have an influence on the type of vertical coordination in the 
network. 
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I. Introduction 
The relationships within a distribution network are characterized by a range of externalities 
under uniform-price contracts. Vertical and horizontal externalities associated with moral-
hazard and incentive problems have been highlighted by the agency literature. This paper deals 
with the bilateral contracting between an upstream firm and the representative retailer in a 
franchise chain. 
Business-format franchising is based on the hiring of immaterial goods, that is to say the 
franchisor’s mark. Moreover, in the franchise relationship, the provision and the promotion of 
the brand name value can be seen as the main task of the franchisor. This effort generates a 
vertical positive externality affecting the franchisee sales result. 
On the other hand, the franchisee selling effort also produces a vertical externality on the 
franchisor’s profit. This failure is emphasized by the horizontal intra-brand externality, and the 
related free-riding problem concerning the selling effort. 
“Selling effort” has to be understood in a broad sense, including all the retailer’s actions to 
increase demand, for example: information on the product, highly trained sales staff and post-
sale services. The horizontal externality appears when a proportion of the selling effort in one 
outlet increases demand within other outlets. It emerges within an intra-brand competition, 
which involves a network of retailers sharing a same brand name. In this situation, a distributor 
can free-ride, and benefit from the other retailers’ efforts to promote the brand name, without 
bearing the costs. 
This horizontal externality at the distribution level is unfavourable to the producer because 
it results in a sub-optimal level of the selling effort. More generally, this externality raises the 
problem of network protection, when several legally autonomous units share a same brand 
name, or benefit simultaneously from a reputation.  
 
In this analytical framework, the vertical contract is either a way to incite (i.e. to reward) 
or to constraint (i.e. to monitor) the franchisor‘s effort concerning the brand name value, and 
the franchisee‘s effort towards the selling activity. Incentive is the target of the share-contract, 
in other words of the monetary terms sharing the profit generated by the decentralized vertical 
structure. 
This explanation has been formalized by the double-sided moral hazard model in 
franchising developed by Lal (1990), Bhattacharyya and Lafontaine (1995). This model takes 
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into account the upstream and the downstream vertical externalities, inducing that the share 
contract is the result of both parties’ need for incentives.  
This framework finds support in the empirical literature. By comparing several agency 
models (risk-sharing, one-sided and two-sided moral hazard models), Lafontaine (1992) shows 
that data is more consistent with incentive issues on both sides.  Agrawal and Lal (1995) 
confront the predictions from the theoretical model presented in Lal (1990) with data. They 
find empirical support to the incentive-based explanation for the use of royalty-rate in franchise 
contracts. Brickley (2002) proxies the moral hazard on franchisor’s side and highlights its 
impact on the monetary provisions. Lastly, Vazquez (2005) takes into account risk sharing and 
bilateral moral hazard issues, as Lafontaine (1992). His empirical results are consistent with the 
agency framework.   
So, while the prior literature in the agency framework has focused on the franchisee’s side 
externality and the need to provide contractual incentives downstream (Mathewson and 
Winter, 1985; Norton, 1988), the two-sided moral-hazard explanation shows that the 
franchisor’s remuneration is also at stake. 
In this field, most work has been done on the franchise fee and the royalty rate as incentive 
devices for the franchisor. Vazquez (2005) includes in the analysis two additional sources of 
revenue for the upstream firm: the advertising rate, and the rents from the sales of inputs to the 
franchisee. 
 
This empirical paper is an attempt to take account of the five franchisor’s sources of 
revenue in order to study the impact of the two-sided externalities and monitoring costs on the 
share contract, and more broadly on the type of vertical coordination chosen by the upstream 
firm. Besides the two main monetary provisions (up-front fee, royalty rate), the advertising rate 
and the inputs sales, we add to the analysis the rate of owned units in the franchise chain.  
 
The advertising rate is a contractual provision which financially involves the downstream 
firm with the promotion of the brand name in charge of the franchisor. Like the royalty rate, it 
is usually a percentage of the downstream sales. Within some networks the franchisee not only 
uses the franchisor’s brand name, but he also retailers the upstream firm’s products. These 
input sales represent significant revenue for the franchisor when the prices are higher than 
marginal costs. Finally, owned units, directly managed by the franchisor, represent another 
source of revenue.   
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Most agency models of franchise contracting imply that the royalty rate and the up-front 
fee are inversely related: the royalty rate is chosen first, as a function of incentive and risk 
issues; the franchise fee comes second to extract rents left downstream by the royalty rate. 
However, the empirical literature provides evidence that these two monetary provisions are not 
necessarily negatively related, and that the initial fee charged to the franchisee may not be a 
major source of profits for the upstream firm.  
Royalties and owned units are also regarded as substitutes, because they are two 
alternative ways for the franchisor to gain some revenue (Scott, 1995). 
 
In order to deal simultaneously with these franchisor incentive mechanisms, our first step is 
to construct a dependant variable combining them. More precisely, this article is organized as 
follows. Section 2 discusses the analytical framework using a simple model of vertical 
contracting with two-sided externalities. Section 3 describes the data on three leading European 
countries in franchising, and the elaboration of the dependant variable by means of a statistical 
classification. Section 4 sets out the testable qualitative predictions. Section 5 presents the 
empirical specifications regarding the explanatory variables, and descriptive statistics. The 
estimations are contained in section 6. The results are mainly consistent with the hypothesis 
provided by the analytical framework. Concluding comments are offered in section 7. 
 
 
II. Analytical framework 
 
In order to study the features of the share contract, we focus on a bilateral relationship between a 
franchisor and a franchisee within a network sharing the same brand name. All the franchise 
contracts are assumed to be identical in the chain, so the downstream firm is the representative 
retailer. The franchisor designs the contract, and the franchisee decision consists in accepting or 
rejecting it. 
In such a situation, residual claimancy appears to be the most incentive mechanism for the 
downstream firm. In that case, the contract includes an up-front fee (F) and no royalties. Once the 
entry fee is paid, the franchisee captures the totality of the results from its sales effort. Because the 
franchisors’ profit does not depend anymore on the sales results, that is to say on the franchisee’s 
effort, this arrangement suppresses the vertical externality. 
However, Bhattacharyya and Lafontaine (1995) demonstrate that royalties are required with 
double-sided externalities, even with risk neutral parties. In this case the optimal royalty-rate incites 
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both the franchisor and the franchisee to invest in their respective inputs (effort). In addition, they 
show that the size of the network does not affect the optimal share parameter; the royalty rate is 
uniform across franchisees. For these reasons their model for profit sharing contracts in franchising 
is a main reference here.  
The problem associated with the use of a royalty rate in the franchise contract is the decrease of 
the franchisee’s incentives. Scott (1995) explains that the presence of owned units in the chain 
limits this dilemma. Distribution outlets directly managed by the upstream firm are an alternative 
way for the franchisor to have an ongoing interest in the profits of the system. This is why, in a dual 
distribution chain, the royalty rate should be lower. We assume that the share contract is dependent 
on the context, in other words that the royalty rate is affected by the other incentive devices for the 
franchisor. 
 
Like Bhattacharyya and Lafontaine (1995), we suppose that the production function for the 
vertical decentralized structure is as follows: 
 
µ+= ),( refX         (1) 
 
where X , the total monetary return produced, is the only contractible variable. 
e denotes the franchisee’s effort, r the franchisor’s effort and µ  is a random term with mean zero 
and variance 2σ . The realization of µ  is assumed to be unobservable to both parties, as the effort 
levels. For this reason any enforceable contract has to be based on the output level. Both parties are 
assumed to be risk neutral. 
 
f  is a standard neoclassical production function. fe and fr denote the partial derivatives.  
 
fe and fr > 0   
 fee and frr < 0   
fer > 0 and f (0,r) = 0 and f (e,0) = 0 
 
This last assumption involves a team production: efforts on both sides are required for any 
production to occur. 
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The disutility functions are U(r) for the franchisor and V(e) for the franchisee. We assume both of 
them to be increasing and constant in effort1: 
U’(r) > 0 and U’’(r) = 0 
V’(e) > 0 and V’’(e) = 0 
 
The five sources of revenue for the franchisor are denoted by F, α, β , φ and λ, with: 
F= the up-front fee 
α = the advertising rate on the output 
β = the royalty rate on the output 
φ = the rate of owned units in the network 
λ = the rents on the input sales  
 
The advertising rate is a complementary provision to the royalty rate. The following sums up the 
two devices. The possible presence of input sales affects the franchisor’s remuneration. This 
presence – or not - is related to the kind of activity in the network, with two possibilities: λ = 1 or λ 
= 0. We take account of two sorts of chains: pure franchising systems (φ = 0) or dual distribution (φ 
≠ 0), considering that the share contract in a bilateral franchising relationship is impacted by the 
type of the network. When φ ≠ 0 or λ ≠ 0, β  tends to be lower. In other words, the share parameter 
varies with the context (rents from the input sales or not, dual distribution or not).  
 
 
The maximization program for the franchisor is then written as: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ){ }
re
rUrefF
,
1
,max −++ ++ϕλβα
    (2) 
 
Subject to: 
(i)       ( 1+++ ϕλβα  ) ( ) ( )rUref r ',' =  
(ii)       (1 - 1++− ϕλβα ) ( ) ( )eVref e ',' =  
(iii) (1 - 1++− ϕλβα ) ( ) ( )eVFref −−, k≥  
 
 
                                                 
1
 The assumption of constant marginal costs of efforts is required within the context of  a distribution network 
(see the case of multiple franchisees in Bhattacharyya and Lafontaine, 1995) 
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With: 
10 ≤ϕp  
211 ≤+ϕp  
11 ≤+ ++ϕλβα  
 
Constraints (i) and (ii) represent respectively the franchisor’s and franchisee’s incentive constraints, 
and (iii) is the franchisee’s participation constraint, with k being the franchisee’s reservation utility. 
From the participation constraint we know that ( )ref ,  must be positive, otherwise F would have 
to be negative. But then the franchisor earns negative profits and is better off not contracting with 
the franchisee. For ( )ref ,  > 0, the team production assumption involves that both e and r are 
positive. U’(r) and V’(e) are both positive. Then if 1+++ ϕλβα  were either 0 or 1, one of the 
incentive conditions would not be satisfied. As a result 1+++ ϕλβα  must be strictly between 0 and 1 
which means that with double-sided externalities and needs for incentives, the output must be 
shared between the franchisor and the franchisee.  
 
( ) ( )[ ]
),('/)('),('/)('
,'/'1
refrUrefeV
rerfrU
re +
=+ ++ϕλβα      (3) 
 
For a given level of ( 1+++ ϕλβα ), the effort levels adjust so that the franchisor’s contribution to the 
sum of marginal disutility weighted by respective productivities is equal to the franchisor’s 
remuneration. So ( 1+++ ϕλβα ) is increasing in the relative importance of the franchisor's effort. 
The franchisor and the franchisee share the output equally ( 1+++ ϕλβα =1/2) when they have 
equal marginal productivities ( ),(' ref r = ),(' ref e ) and equal disutility of effort ( )(' rU = )(' eV ). 
F, the up-front fee, is not present in (3). This observation is coherent with the idea that this fee 
affects neither the choice of effort, nor total surplus. More generally, it is consistent with the 
proposal that the franchise fee is chosen to meet the franchisee’s reservation utility (F is included in 
the franchisee’s participation constraint), whereas the share-parameters ( 1+++ ϕλβα ) allow the 
repartition of the surplus. At the same time, the franchisor would use F to extract rents left 
downstream. 
 
Finally, this model shows that the share contract, and more precisely here the franchisor’s 
remuneration, determines the two parties’ efforts. Originally, these effort levels are related to both 
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the two-sided externalities and the monitoring costs, in other words to the possibility for one party 
to constraint the other. When the monitoring costs are high, which means that it is difficult to 
monitor the other firm, incentives are an appropriate way to favour the other party’s effort. 
Considering this context (potential externalities, monitoring costs), the upstream firm designs the 
type of vertical coordination (mainly: the rate of owned units in the network and the royalty rate on 
each franchisee’s output) defining the levels of the optimal efforts. 
  
 
 
 
 
III. International and multi-sector data 
 
1. FRANCHISING IN EUROPE 
 
Europe appears to be the continent of franchise. According to the European Franchise Federation, 
2500 distinct franchised brands were operating in the United States in 2007, whereas about 8300 
were operating in Europe. So the number of franchised brands in the United States is only 30 
percent of the total number of distinct brands in Europe. Moreover, most franchised brands 
operating in Europe (close to 80%) are domestic ones, native to Europe. 
The countries concerned are: Austria, Belgium, Britain, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, Poland, Russia and Turkey. Our empirical study compiles data concerning the 
three leading European countries for franchising: France, Germany and Spain. 
Another feature of the franchising sector in Europe is its diversity. Our unique collected dataset 
takes into account a wide range of activities, grouped together into 8 main sectors.   
 
 
 
2. THE SAMPLE 
 
Our dataset was extracted from a computerized version of the 2006 Forby’s Franchise Guide. The 
information contained in this source comes directly from the networks. The sample consists of 1869 
chains, in three European leading countries for franchising: Germany, Spain and France (table 1).  
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Table I. International distribution of sample networks (1869 networks) 
Country Number of Networks 
Germany 681 
France 528 
Spain 660 
 
 
The data includes a broad range of trade and service industries. We distinguish eight sectors 
(table 2): services for individuals (SERVIND), services for businesses (SERVBUSINES), 
miscellaneous services for businesses and individuals (MISCEL), equipment for individuals 
(EQUIPINDI), home equipment (HOMEQUIP), hotels/coffee-bar/restaurants (HCR), automobile 
(AUTO) and food (FOOD). 
 
 
Table II. Sector-based distribution of sample networks (1869 networks) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3. TWO KINDS OF VERTICAL CONTRACTING 
 
Sectors Label Part in the Sample 
Services for individuals SERVIND 12.3% 
Miscellaneous services for individuals and 
businesses 
MISCEL 17.9% 
Automobile AUTO 4.8% 
Food FOOD 7.2% 
Equipment for individuals INDEQ 18.3% 
Home equipment HOMEQ 16.2% 
Hotels, Coffee-bar, Restaurants HCR 15.2% 
Services for businesses SERVBU 8.1% 
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In order to study the impact of the bilateral externalities and monitoring costs on contracting 
within a distribution network, we discern in the sample two main types of vertical 
relationships by means of a statistical classification2. 
This classification takes into account the two main monetary provisions (the up-front fee 
and the royalty rate) and two additional sources of revenue for the franchisor: the advertising 
rate and the proportion of owned units. We construct the variable ROYALTY combining the 
royalty and the advertising rates. 
Input sales are not included here for two reasons. First, in the dataset, the information 
concerning this variable is only available as a dummy indicating the presence or absence of 
inputs sold by the franchisor to the franchisees. The second, and main reason, is that this is 
not a decisional variable for the franchisor, because it is related to the type of activity in the 
network. However, considering that rents from the input sales may affect the share-contract 
and the type of vertical relationship, we include them later, in the econometric model, as an 
explanatory variable. 
 
Table 3 presents the variables used for the k-means classification.  
 
 
Table III. Variables used to define the type of vertical relationship (1869 networks) 
 
Variable Measures Mean Std.Dev. Min. Max. 
 
ROYALTY 
 
Royalty  
+ advertising rate 
 
 
3.004 
 
3.089 
 
.000 
 
15 
FEE Up-front fee  (€) * 
 
1.263 1.012 .100E-02 7.2 
 
OWNRATE 
Number of owned units 
in the network / size of 
the European network. 
.981E-01 .254 .000 1 
  
* values divided by 10 000 
 
 
 
The classification results in two groups of networks depending on the type of vertical 
coordination: one using dual distribution (DUAL), and the other using more vertical restraints 
(RESTRAINTS).  
                                                 
2
 K.means classification. 
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The first group (DUAL) gathers 908 franchise chains. The typical network in this group 
includes owned units, the share-contract is characterized by a franchise fee equal to 1 and the 
sum of the advertising and the royalty rates equal to 0.5. 
The second group (RESTRAINTS) represents 961 franchise chains. The typical network 
includes no owned units, the share-contract is characterized by a franchise fee higher than 1 
and royalties higher than 3%. 
 
Tables 4 and 5 present statistics related to the two groups. 
 
Table IV.  Summary statistics for CONTRACT (1869 networks) 
 
 DUAL (908 networks) RESTRAINTS
 
(961 networks) 
Variable Mean Std.Dev. Min. Max. Mean Std.Dev Min. Max. 
OWNRATE 0.128 0.290 0 1 0.068 0.210 0 1 
FEE 1.045 0.889 0.01 7.15 1.421 1.065 0.03 7.2 
ROYALTY 0.414 0.681 0 2.24 5.576 2.298 2 15 
FRANCE 0.273 0.445 0 1 0.291 0.454 0 1 
GERMANY 0.367 0.482 0 1 0.361 0.480 0 1 
SPAIN 0.359 0.479 0 1 0.347 0.476 0 1 
SERVIND 0.130 0.337 0 1 0.116 0.320 0 1 
MISCEL 0.193 0.394 0 1 0.167 0.373 0 1 
AUTO 0.049 0.216 0 1 0.048 0.214 0 1 
FOOD 0.079 0.270 0 1 0.067 0.250 0 1 
INDEQ 0.240 0.427 0 1 0.129 0.336 0 1 
HOMEQ 0.157 0.364 0 1 0.166 0.372 0 1 
HCR 0.081 0.273 0 1 0.215 0.411 0 1 
SERVBU 0.069 0.254 0 1 0.091 0.289 0 1 
 
 
 
As shown by table 4, within the networks classified as DUAL, the rate of owned units is 
higher and, on the contrary, the royalty rate and the franchise fee are far lower.  
 
 
 
Table V. Distribution of the two vertical relationships (1869 networks) 
 
Variable DUAL (908) RESTRAINTS (961)  
FRAN 46.97% 53.03% 100% 
GERM 49.04% 50.96% 100% 
SPAIN 49.39% 50.61% 100% 
  
SERVIND 13.04% 11.63%  
MISCEL 19.26% 16.61%  
AUTO 4.90% 4.76%  
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FOOD 7.90% 6.64%  
INDEQ 24.04% 12.96%  
HOMEQ 15.79% 16.61%  
HCR 8.13% 21.59%  
SERVBU 6.94% 9.20%  
 100% 100%  
 
 
Table 5 shows that there are many networks classified as DUAL
 
in the “Equipment for 
individuals” sector, and many networks classified as RESTRAINTS in the “Hotels, Coffee-bar, 
Restaurants” sector.  
This table highlights the fact that there are no main international differences in the 
distribution of the two kinds of vertical contracting.  
 
Finally, three conclusions emerge from the classification: 
 
1/ The royalties and the owned units appear as two alternative ways to remunerate the 
franchisor. This result is consistent with the analytical framework. 
 
2/ However, contrary to what is suggested by the theoretical models of franchising, the fee 
and the royalty rate are not inversely related here. Lafontaine (1992), Scott (1995), Lafontaine 
and Shaw (1999) obtain a similar result from econometric estimations on American data. The 
general explanation is that the franchisor does not extract the whole rent downstream. 
 
3/ The choice to have - or not - owned units in the chain appears to be a key determinant 
of the classes, and a key determinant of the vertical relationships designed by the upstream 
firm. This issue is precisely the focus of attention in the literature on dual distribution (Bai 
and Tao, 2000; Pénard et al., 2003; Lafontaine and Shaw, 2005). 
The presence of owned units in the chain can be interpreted as a credible commitment of 
the franchisor to promote the brand name, because in this case he is directly involved in the 
network (Scott, 1995). In addition, it is a means for the franchisor to monitor the franchised 
units (Lafontaine and Shaw 2005), notably by being geographically close to them. 
 
Considering the analytical framework and the above results, it is possible to formulate 
several testable predictions. 
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IV. Testable predictions 
 
Underlying assumptions can be made concerning the type of vertical relationship preferred by 
the franchisee and the franchisor. 
 It is indeed relevant to assume that the franchisee prefers DUAL networks 
 
to RESTRAINTS 
networks: DUAL
 
means i) less monetary restrictions, meaning the contract is closer to residual 
claimancy, and ii) the franchisor is committed to the promotion of the shared brand name 
because he operates certain outlets. 
The situation is more ambiguous when it comes to the franchisor’s preference. He will 
prefer RESTRAINTS if franchised units are regarded as more profitable than owned units 
(Gallini and Lutz 1992, Lafontaine 1993, Scott 1995). 
However, to include owned units in the network (DUAL) is a way for the franchisor to 
preserve the brand name value within a context of downstream opportunism, and a means of 
monitoring the franchised units. So, when the potential downstream externality is high, we 
may observe a vertical coordination corresponding to DUAL. This consideration leads to our 
first testable prediction. 
 
1. FRANCHISEE’S SIDE EXTERNALITY  
 
Taking into account the fact that it is easier for the franchisor to monitor the franchisees and to 
promote the brand name value when the network includes some owned units, we assume that: 
  
Hypothesis 1: The higher the probability of having more vertical integration in the network 
(DUAL), the higher the potential downstream horizontal externality (potential free-riding on 
the promotional effort). 
 
Since Brickley (1999), this hypothesis is common in the agency empirical literature on franchising. 
 
 
2. FRANCHISOR’S SIDE EXTERNALITY  
 
 14 
It is common for agency models to focus on the selling effort of only one party, the agent. Our 
analytical framework incorporates the necessity within the vertical relationship to provide 
incentives for the franchisor’s effort too.  
If owned units are a means to promote the brand name, it is pertinent to assume that a chain with 
a strong reputation has no need for owned units (RESTRAINTS). When the brand name value is high, 
we may observe a vertical coordination corresponding to RESTRAINTS, considering that i) 
franchising signifies renting out a brand name, and that ii) franchised units are more profitable than 
owned units. 
However, the reverse hypothesis is relevant: the more the brand name value is high, the more the 
downstream opportunism is a problem therefore the franchisor must exert greater control (DUAL).    
This is why we formulate the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 2: The higher the probability of having more vertical restraints in the network 
(RESTRAINTS), the higher the brand name value. Nevertheless, the reverse sign is pertinent.  
 
 
3. FRANCHISEE’S SIDE MONITORING COST 
 
 
Within contracts of low duration, it is easier for the upstream firm to monitor the franchised units by 
excluding shirking franchisees from the network. For this reason, contract duration and owned units 
can be seen as two alternative ways to control the franchisees. As a consequence, we may observe a 
vertical coordination corresponding to RESTRAINTS when the duration is low. We can therefore 
predict that:  
 
Hypothesis 3: The higher the probability of having more vertical restraints in the network 
(RESTRAINTS), the lower the cost of monitoring the franchised units (short duration). 
 
 
4. FRANCHISOR’S SIDE MONITORING COST 
 
We take into account the difficulty for the franchisees to monitor the franchisor’s effort by means of 
the presence - or not - of a franchisees council in the network. Such councils assemble elected 
franchisees and franchisor managers. They are a way for the franchisees to counterbalance the 
decisional power of the upstream firm. Regarding owned units as a commitment from the franchisor 
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to promote the brand name, the presence of a franchisees council in the network can be seen as a 
substitute for owned units. For this reason, we assume that: 
 
Hypothesis 4: The higher the probability of having more vertical restraints in the network 
(RESTRAINTS), the lower the cost of monitoring the franchisor (presence of a franchisees council). 
 
 
 V. Empirical specifications 
 
 
1. EXPLANATORY VARIABLES 
 
 
A. Measuring the free-riding on the selling effort 
 
The size of the network (SIZE) is the number of outlets sharing the same brand name, 
franchised and owned units. Logically, the wider it is the higher the potential intra-brand 
horizontal externality. Consequently, the vertical coordination in the chain may correspond to 
DUAL (Hypothesis 1). This proxy variable has been previously used in the same way by 
Arrunada et al. (2001). 
We use a second proxy for the horizontal externality: the number of potential customers 
per outlet (TERRITORY). This is an area delimiting the scope of each outlet. It functions in a 
reverse way compared to the first proxy: the wider it is, the lower the potential intra-brand 
horizontal externality. Therefore, we expect a choice for RESTRAINTS (Hypothesis 1) in the 
chain. 
 
 
B. Measuring the brand name value 
 
The age of the network is frequently used as a proxy for the brand name value (Lafontaine, 
1992 ; Arrunada et al., 2001). In this case we refer to the company’s date of creation minus 
the first franchised unit’s date of creation (AGE). The above result corresponds to the lapse of 
time required to create the concept that will be franchised later. The longer the period of time 
the more valuable the concept. Therefore, we expect a positive link between this proxy 
variable and the choice for RESTRAINTS (Hypothesis 2). 
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Another proxy for the brand name value is the power of the chain, in terms of turnover. 
We use the network turnover divided by the sector turnover (LEADER). Here again, a positive 
sign is expected with RESTRAINTS
 
(Hypothesis 2). 
 
 
C. Measuring the monitoring costs 
  
As mentioned above, the cost of the franchisor’s monitoring of the franchisee is estimated 
according to the length of the contract (DURATION). This is a contractual provision, defined at the 
beginning of the relationship. A long duration (high monitoring cost) should correspond to DUAL 
(Hypothesis 3).    
In order to measure the franchisee’s difficulty monitoring the franchisor, we use a dummy 
variable (COUNCIL) that equals 1 if there is a council in the network, and 0 otherwise. Vazquez 
(2005) has previously used such a proxy on Spanish data. The presence of a franchisees council in 
the chain (low monitoring cost) should match with RESTRAINTS (Hypothesis 4). 
 
 
D. Control variables 
 
We include three types of dummy variables that control the country and the sector effects, and the 
impact of the input sales. 
 
Table 6 sums up all the explanatory variables. 
 
 
Table VI. The explanatory variables 
 
Downstream horizontal externality (free-riding on the promotional effort) 
SIZE 
TERRITORY   
 
 
Upstream vertical externality (brand name value) 
AGE 
LEADER 
 
Downstream monitoring cost 
 
DURATION   
Upstream monitoring cost 
 
COUNCIL   
Additional franchisor’s incentive  INPUTSALES 
 
Country dummies 
Sector dummies 
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2. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
All the variables used for the estimations are presented in table 7. The dependent variable is the 
dummy variable CONTRACT, defining the type of vertical relationship (DUAL versus RESTRAINTS).  
 
Table VII. The variables (1869 networks: France/Germany/Spain) 
 
Label 
 
Measures 
 
Mean 
 
Std.Dev.        
 
Min 
 
Max 
 
CONTRACT 
Dummy variable defining the type 
of coordination 
0: DUAL 
1: RESTRAINTS 
 
.514      
 
.499      
 
.000     
 
1 
 
SIZE 
 
 
Size of the European network 
 
118.766 
 
451.724 
 
.000 
 
4600 
 
TERRITORY 
Number of potential customers per 
outlet (divided by 100 000) 
 
.835 
 
3.349 
 
.200E-03 
 
108 
 
AGE 
Date of creation of the company 
minus date of creation of the first 
franchised unit 
 
7.255 
 
16.754 
 
.000 
 
250 
 
LEADER 
Network turnover divided by the 
sector turnover 
 
.777E-02 
 
.129E-01 
 
.141E-03 
 
.151 
 
COUNCIL 
Presence or absence of a 
franchisees council in the network: 
dummy variable (1/0) 
 
.422 
 
.494 
 
.000 
 
1 
 
DURATION 
 
 
Duration of the contract (years) 
 
 
7.312 
 
10.857 
 
1 
 
110 
 
INPUTSALES 
 
Presence or absence of inputs sold 
by the franchisor  to franchisees: 
dummy variable (1/0) 
 
 
.580 
 
.493 
 
0 
 
1 
 
GERMANY 
 
Indicating the country (1/0) 
 
.364 
 
.481 
 
0 
 
1 
 
FRANCE 
 
Indicating the country (1/0) 
 
.282 
 
.450 
 
0 
 
1 
 
SPAIN 
 
Indicating the country (1/0) 
 
.353 
 
.478 
 
0 
 
1 
 
SERVIND 
Services for individuals: hair and 
beauty care, education, sports and 
leisure. Dummy (1/0) 
 
.123 
 
.328 
 
0 
 
1 
 
MISCEL 
Miscellaneous services for 
individuals and businesses: 
building, advertising, computers, 
telecom. Dummy (1/0) 
 
.179 
 
.384 
 
0 
 
1 
 
AUTO 
Automobile: maintenance, 
equipment, rental. Dummy (1/0) 
 
.487E-01  
 
.215 
 
0 
 
1 
 
FOOD 
 
Food. Dummy (1/0) 
 
.731E-01  
 
.260 
 
0 
 
1 
 
INDEQ 
Equipment for individuals: textiles, 
clothing, accessories. Dummy 
(1/0) 
 
.182 
 
.386 
 
0 
 
1 
 
HOMEQ 
 
 
Home equipment. Dummy (1/0) 
 
.162 
 
.368 
 
0 
 
1 
 
HCR 
Hotels,Coffee-bar, Restaurants. 
Dummy (1/0) 
 
.151 
 
.358 
 
0 
 
1 
 
Services for businesses. Dummy 
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SERVBU 
 
(1/0) .081E-01  .273 0 1 
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VI. Estimations 
  
1. THE MODEL 
 
In order to study the impact of the two-sided externalities and monitoring costs on the vertical 
relationships we estimate the following logit equation: 
 
Prob (CONTRACT
i
 = 1 /X
i 
) = α
0
+ α
1
 
SIZE
i
+  
 
α
2
 
TERRITORY
i
+  
 
α
3
 
AGE
 i
+ α
4
 
LEADER
i  
+ 
 < 0  > 0  > 0  > 0 
 
 
α
5
 
 
COUNCIL 
i
+ 
 
 
α
6
 
 
DURATION  
i 
+ α7  INPUTSALES i +∑
=
3
1p
α
p
8  COUNTRY i +∑
=
8
1s
α
S
9 SECTOR i + εi 
> 0  < 0 
  
i = {1, …,1869}         (1) 
p = {1, …,3}          
s  = {1, …,8}          
 
 
Where:  
ε = the error term. 
i = network 
p = country (Germany as reference) 
s = sector (Miscellaneous services for individuals and businesses as reference) 
The symbols <0 and >0 below the parameters indicate the predicted sign 
 
In order to perform robustness tests, we estimate additional models including no sector dummies 
(2), or using the probit estimator (3), (4).  
 
 
2. THE RESULTS  
 
The estimation results are reported in table n° 8. 
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Table VIII.  Results for the dependent variable CONTRACT 
 
 
Independent 
variable 
 
Logit  
 
(1) 
 
Coefficient 
(std. error) 
 
 
Logit  
  
(2) 
 
Coefficient 
(std. error) 
 
 
Probit  
  
(3) 
 
Coefficient 
(std. error) 
 
 
Probit  
  
(4) 
 
Coefficient 
(std. error) 
 
CONSTANT .255** 
(.123) 
 
.346*** 
(.109) 
.159** 
(.765E-01) 
 
.215*** 
(.680E-01) 
 
SIZE -.193E-03** 
(.938E-04) 
-.222E-03** 
(.920E-04) 
 
-.120E-03** 
(.578E-04) 
 
-.139E-03** 
(.569E-04) 
 
TERRITORY .248E-03** 
(.110E-03) 
 
.234E-03** 
(.106E-03) 
 
.154E-03** 
(.679E-04) 
 
.146E-03** 
(.663E-04) 
 
AGE -.262E-03 
(.755E-03) 
-.637E-03 
(.726E-03) 
-.143E-03 
(.436E-03) 
 
-.372E-03 
(.427E-03) 
 
LEADER .397E-03*** 
(.106E-03) 
 
.385E-03*** 
(.102E-03) 
 
.245E-03*** 
(.656E-04) 
 
.240E-03*** 
(.641E-04) 
 
COUNCIL .234E-03* 
(.129E-03) 
 
.274E-03** 
(.125E-03) 
 
.144E-03* 
(.795E-04) 
 
.169E-03** 
(.779E-04) 
 
DURATION .567E-03*** 
(.131E-03) 
.583E-03*** 
(.128E-03) 
 
.345E-03*** 
(.799E-04) 
 
.361E-03*** 
(.790E-04) 
 
INPUTSALES .267 
(.168) 
 
.101E-03 
(.196E-03) 
 
.161 
(.103) 
 
.621E-04 
(.122E-03) 
 
FRANCE .561*** 
(.157) 
 
.451*** 
(.151) 
 
.337*** 
(.955E-01) 
 
.278*** 
(.931E-01) 
 
SPAIN .262E-01 
(.155) 
 
.194E-01 
(.151) 
 
.144E-01 
(.956E-01) 
 
.966E-02 
(.935E-01) 
 
Sector dummies     included not included included not included 
 
Results corrected for heteroskedasticity 
 
Prob[ChiSqd > 
value] 
.00000 .00000 .00000 .00000 
Number of 
observations                
1869   1869   1869   1869   
% Predicted 62 58.4 62 58.4 
 
 
* Significant at the 10 % level * * Significant at the 5 % level * * * Significant at the 1 % level 
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The results are qualitatively similar in the four models, hence leading to the conclusion of 
robustness. 
The variables SIZE, TERRITORY, LEADER, COUNCIL and DURATION have a significant impact in the 
four regressions concerning the type of vertical relationship (p < 0.01 for LEADER and DURATION, p 
< 0.05 for SIZE and TERRITORY, p < 0.1 for COUNCIL). 
These results lend empirical support to the hypothesis H1, H2 and H4. 
As predicted by H1, the variable SIZE has a negative influence on the probability to have 
RESTRAINTS. This means that the larger the distribution network, the lower the probability to have a 
vertical coordination using vertical restraints rather than owned units (RESTRAINTS). In addition, the 
positive sign concerning the impact of the proxy TERRITORY is as expected: the larger the consumer 
area for each outlet (low horizontal downstream externality), the higher the probability to have 
more vertical restraints (higher values for the franchise fee and the royalty rate) and no owned units. 
The results concerning the variable LEADER show that the probability for coordination by means 
of vertical restraints, exclusively, rises with the power of the network in terms of turnover. This is 
consistent with H2. 
Finally, as predicted by H4, the variable COUNCIL exerts a positive influence on the probability 
that the chain chooses RESTRAINTS: the lower the cost of the franchisees’ monitoring of the 
franchisor, the higher the probability of having coordination in the chain by means of vertical 
restraints and no owned units. 
Nevertheless, the positive impact of the variable DURATION on the probability to have 
RESTRAINTS
 
is the opposite of the predicted one: the longer the contract, the higher the probability to 
have restrictive monetary contractual provisions instead of owned units in the network. In addition, 
the time needed to develop the brand name (AGE) used as a proxy for the brand name value, has no 
significant influence on the type of vertical relationship. A similar unpredicted conclusion can be 
applied to the input sales. 
The dummies for the countries show that the choices made by the French networks differ 
significantly from the German ones (p < 0.01): French networks are more likely to use RESTRAINTS, 
in other words to use vertical restraints rather than owned units to organise the distribution network. 
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VII. Conclusion 
 
This research had two goals: i) introducing the five franchisor’s payment variables in order  to 
expand the double-sided externalities’ theoretical framework, ii) defining the ways in which share-
contract differs according to the type of coordination within the vertical structure (dual distribution 
instead of a pure franchise system, presence –or not- of rents derived from input sales). 
 The pertinence of this twofold issue is confirmed by an empirical and econometric analysis.  
 First, the variables related to the franchisor’s remuneration and resulting from a strategic 
decision are synthesized within the variable CONTRACT. The construction of this variable clearly 
highlights two types of vertical relationships. On the one hand, a network with owned units and a 
lower level of vertical restraints (DUAL), and on the other, a network without owned units and a 
higher level of vertical restraints (RESTRAINTS). 
 The econometric estimations confirm the significant influence of the externalities of both the 
franchisee’s and franchisor’s sides on the chosen type of vertical relationship (DUAL versus 
RESTRAINTS). Furthermore, the results highlight the impact of the two-sided monitoring costs on the 
above choice.   
Dual distribution is one of the main points of this analysis which goes even further. It is the first 
attempt in literature to combine the issues of dual distribution and share-contract. This combination 
has proven itself to be an interesting lead for further researches.  
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Appendix 1: 
Histograms for the three variables defining the two types of contract 
 
 
 
 
FEE
Histogram for Variable FEE
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ROYALTY
Histogram for Variable ROYALTY
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OWNRATE
Histogram for Variable OWNRATE
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Appendix 2: 
Summary results for the core explanatory variables 
 
 
Table IX. Logit equation (1) for CONTRACT 
CONTRACT Expected Evidence 
α1 (SIZE) - -
**
 
α2  (TERRITORY) + +
**
 
α3  (AGE) + non-significant 
α4  (LEADER) + +
***
 
α5  (COUNCIL) + +
*
 
α6   (DURATION) - +
***
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